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WAIVING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN DELAWARE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES
Winnifred A. Lewis*
In corporations, like most other business associations, fiduciary duties
exist to deter management from abusing their power over the owners’
property. In Delaware limited partnerships and limited liability companies,
this protection can be waived in the operating agreement. This Note
explores the effects of retaining or waiving fiduciary duties and how this
plays out in the interpretation of operating agreements. It argues that
default fiduciary duties exist for limited liability companies and limited
partnerships, including those that are member managed, and it proposes a
combination of disclosure and signature requirements from each limited
partner or member in order for waiver of fiduciary duties to be effective.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Gatz Properties LLC, Auriga Capital Corporation, and several
minority investors formed Peconic Bay, a Delaware limited liability
company (LLC).1 Peconic Bay was created to develop a golf course.2 To
do so, it leased property from the Gatz family and then sublet to American
Golf Corporation, a golf course development company.3 Peconic Bay was
governed by an LLC agreement that designated Gatz Properties as manager
and allocated voting in such a way as to give Gatz Properties control.4 Gatz
Properties, in turn, was managed and controlled by William Gatz.5
The golf course venture was never profitable.6 By 2005, Gatz knew
American Golf would elect to terminate the sublease in 2010,7 effectively
ending Peconic Bay’s only source of revenue. In 2007, in anticipation of
American Golf’s decision, Gatz commissioned an appraisal of the

1. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1208 (Del.),
aff’g 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1209.
4. Id. at 1208–09.
5. Id. at 1208.
6. Id. at 1209.
7. See id.
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property.8 The appraiser valued the land with golf course improvements at
$10.1 million and as vacant land available for development at $15 million.9
Later that year, another golf course development company, RDC Golf
Group, expressed interest in acquiring Peconic Bay’s long-term lease.10
Gatz refused to permit due diligence and criticized RDC’s revenue
projections as overly optimistic.11 RDC submitted a nonbinding offer to
acquire Peconic Bay’s ground lease and American Golf’s sublease for $3.75
million.12 The offer was rejected by a membership vote, controlled by
Gatz, as was a second offer of $4.15 million.13 RDC again raised its level
of interest, this time to $6 million,14 but Gatz did not respond to this
approach.15
Instead, Gatz offered to purchase Peconic Bay’s minority interests
himself for the amount the minority investors would receive if Peconic
Bay’s assets were sold for $5.6 million.16 Gatz did not inform the minority
investors of his failure to respond to RDC’s offer of $6 million.17 The
minority holders nonetheless rejected Gatz’s offer.18
Gatz then hired an appraiser for Peconic Bay, but he gave the appraiser
incomplete information.19 Using only American Golf’s historical financial
data, the appraiser found that Peconic Bay had no net positive value.20 Gatz
then proposed to sell Peconic Bay at auction.21 After a desultory marketing
effort, Gatz was the only bidder, and he purchased Peconic Bay.22 The
minority members collectively received $20,985.23 The auctioneer received
$80,000 for his services.24
After the auction, the minority investors brought suit against Gatz based
on his active mismanagement of Peconic Bay.25 Intuitively, it would seem
Gatz should be held liable. Under either a partnership or a corporate law
schema of fiduciary duties, Gatz had clearly breached his duty of loyalty to
the minority members;26 under LLC law, however, the success of such a

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1209–10.
14. Id. at 1210.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1211.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1212. Compare this to the $734,131 the minority investors would have
received had they accepted Gatz’s earlier offer to buy them out, which presumably was
already a low bid. Id. at 1210.
24. Id. at 1212.
25. See id.
26. See infra notes 49, 77–84, 112–19 and accompanying text.
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suit depended on the LLC agreement.27 Peconic Bay, as a Delaware LLC,
could eliminate all fiduciary duties in the operating agreement,28 but
Peconic Bay’s LLC agreement arguably did not directly address the
existence or contours of the fiduciary duties that Gatz owed to Peconic
Bay’s members.29 In the face of silence or ambiguity, what, if any, legal
duties constrained Gatz’s conduct?
Clarity and predictability of these duties has grown in importance as
LLCs and limited partnerships (LPs) have grown increasingly popular.30
There is now a significantly greater number of LLCs being formed annually
than corporations, both nationally,31 and in Delaware.32 In Delaware, in
2011, three times as many LLCs as corporations were formed.33 There is
an increasing number of LPs in Delaware as well, although the jump is not
as dramatic.34
Not only is the increasing number making these entities more important,
but so is the amount of capital and type of firm which typically selects these
as their form of organization. Limited partnerships are increasingly the
organization of choice for private equity firms, venture capital firms, and
hedge funds.35 As of the first quarter of 2012, the hedge fund industry was
comprised of approximately 7,659 firms, with an aggregate capital of more
than two trillion dollars.36 Publicly traded LPs and LLCs have billions of
dollars in assets.37 As a result of this growth, the legal contours of fiduciary
27. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005).
28. See id.
29. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 856 (Del.
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
30. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractability and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 191 & n.10 (2011).
31. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study
of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between
2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 459, 473 tbl.I-D (2010) (providing empirical data illustrating that, compared to
corporations, two times more LLCs were formed in 2007 in the United States).
32. See DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2011), available at
http://corp.delaware.gov/2011CorpAR.pdf (providing a graph of New Business Formations
from 2009–2011, showing formation of Delaware LLCs outpacing that of corporations three
to one in 2011).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
289, 298–300 (2009).
36. See Eric Uhlfelder, Best 100 Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (May 19, 2012),
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424053111904571704577404264215025458.html
#articleTabs_article%3D1.
37. In 2012, Delaware was home to eighty-five publicly traded LPs and LLCs. See
Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence
from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 598 (2012). These are primarily oil
and gas companies and coal, mineral, and timber companies, although there are also a few
investment and financial management firms. See id. at 599–603 app.A; see also PTPs
Currently Traded on U.S. Exchanges, NAT’L ASS’N OF PUBLICLY TRADED P’SHIPS,
http://naptp.org/PTP101/CurrentPTPs.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing all currently
publicly traded partnerships, totaling 101 limited partnerships and fourteen limited liability
companies).
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duties in these entities are gaining increasing significance.38 When
someone like Gatz is managing billions of dollars, there is arguably more at
stake, both for the investors and the market at large.
In Delaware, the applicability of fiduciary duties to these entities depends
on the language of the operating agreement.39 The Delaware Court of
Chancery has emphasized the existence of so-called “default” fiduciary
duties—shorthand for duties arising from equity and common law that exist
in the absence of contractual modification by the parties.40 The Chancery
Court found Gatz liable for violating his fiduciary duties to Peconic Bay’s
minority members,41 but the Delaware Supreme Court did not share this
view.42 While the Delaware Supreme Court held Gatz liable for his
conduct, it did so on contractual grounds.43
The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling raised questions of whether, when,
and how default fiduciary duties apply to limited liability companies.44 The
debate over the wisdom of implying these duties continues.45 While recent
Delaware legislation seems to have clarified the existence of default
fiduciary duties, at least in certain circumstances, the applicability of these
duties remains undefined.
This Note explores recent Delaware case law regarding fiduciary duties
in LPs and LLCs. Part I begins by reviewing the origins of fiduciary duties
and their application in Delaware business law. It then outlines the history
of LPs and LLCs and examines how fiduciary duties function in the context
38. According to at least one list, two recent cases concerning default fiduciary duties in
LLCs and LPs made the top five key corporate and commercial cases of 2012. See Francis
G.X. Pileggi & Kevin F. Brady, Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions in
2012, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/
2013/01/articles/annual-review-of-cases/key-delaware-corporate-and-commercial-decisionsin-2012/.
39. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
40. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 849–56 (Del.
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
41. Id. at 875.
42. The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion was passionate enough to make the news.
See, e.g., Del. High Court to Chancery Chief: Keep World Views to Yourself, REUTERS.COM
(Nov. 7, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/delaware-law-strineidUSL1E8M7P8620121108; Peter Lattman, In Unusual Move, Delaware Supreme Court
Rebukes a Judge, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2012, 8:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2012/11/09/in-unusual-move-the-delaware-supreme-court-rebukes-a-judge/;
Gordon
Smith, Delaware Infighting, CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.
org/2012/11/delaware-infighting.html.
43. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1208.
44. See, e.g., Michael C. Hefter & Ryan M. Philip, The Debate Rages on Regarding
Whether Default Fiduciary Duties Apply to LLC Managers Under Delaware Law, NAT’L L.
REV. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/debate-rages-regarding-whetherdefault-fiduciary-duties-apply-to-llc-managers-under-; Carl Neff, Delaware Supreme Court
Declines To Hold that Default Fiduciary Duties Are Owed in LLCs, DEL. CT. OF CHANCERY
PRAC. BLOG (Dec. 30, 2012), http://delawarechancery.foxrothschild.com/fiduciaryduties/delaware-supreme-court-declines-to-hold-that-default-fiduciary-durites-are-owed-inllcs/.
45. See, e.g., On-Line Symposium: Default Fiduciary Duties in LLCs and LPs,
WIDENER L., http://blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/on-line-symposium-default-fiduciaryduties-in-llcs-and-lps/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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of these unincorporated firms. Part II outlines the conflicting arguments
regarding whether default fiduciary duties should apply in LLCs and LPs,
contrasting the traditionalist view with the contractarian. Part III argues
that default fiduciary duties apply to both LLCs and LPs, including those
that are member managed. This Note then contends that a combination of
disclosure and signatures should be required in order to waive fiduciary
duties.
I. FROM FUNDAMENTAL TO DISPOSABLE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES, LLCS, AND LPS
Part I discusses the origins of fiduciary duties and outlines their
application in the context of Delaware business law. Next, it explains the
history and structure of LLCs and LPs. It then explores how fiduciary
duties apply to these entities.
A. Fiduciary Duties and Their Role in Business Associations
This section first describes the equitable origins of fiduciary duties and
then gives an overview of their application in the context of corporations.
1. The Equitable Origins of Fiduciary Duties
At their foundation, fiduciary relationships are characterized by one
person placing special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another.46
Typical examples of such relationships are trustees managing assets for
beneficiaries,47 agents acting on behalf of principals,48 and partners
working together on a joint venture.49
The law recognizes each of these as a special circumstance and provides
protection by imposing special duties on the person acting on the other’s
behalf.50 The law imposes a heightened duty of care and fidelity on this
person.51 This was famously articulated by Justice Cardozo, writing that
business partners are “held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
46. See, e.g., Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 661 (Del. Ch. 2012) (quoting
Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. 13929, 1995 WL 409015, at *2 (Del.
Ch. July 5, 1995)).
47. See, e.g., Keech v. Sandford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch.) (imposing heightened
duties on a trustee managing a lease for beneficiary); A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 17.2.7
n.2 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing application of Keech in the United States).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (2006) (discussing fiduciary
character of agency relationship).
49. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties.”).
50. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991); see
also id. at 1046 n.3 (discussing paradigmatic forms of fiduciary relationships).
51. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY, AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES
IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1991); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882.

2013]

WAIVING FIDUCIARY DUTIES

1023

sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”52 These fiduciary duties can
never be waived—they are an intrinsic part of each of these legal
relationships.53
While to an extent there is a moral aspect to the imposition of these
duties54—to not damage, steal, or waste what was given in trust—there are
economic reasons for these duties, as well.55 A result of trust in, and
reliance on, another is the separation of ownership and control.56 The
person who owns the property gives it to another person to manage.57 The
manager thus controls the property and does what he must in order to make
the property productive.58 His obligations are open ended, as each decision
that would make the property productive cannot be thought of in advance.59
The owner, by contrast, is not involved; he holds legal ownership, but that
is all.60 What is difficult for the owner to know is what the manager is
doing day to day.61 How then can the owner keep the manager from
misconduct?
Fiduciary duties are “formulated . . . proscriptive rules of fiduciary
conduct.”62 Thus the manager knows ahead of time what he can and cannot
do. Since both manager and owner know from the outset that fiduciary
rules govern, these duties deter managerial abuse.63 By deterring
managerial abuse, these duties decrease agency costs—the costs of
monitoring management in these relationships.64
2. Corporate Directors Are Fiduciaries
The directors of a corporation are fiduciaries because they manage the
corporation for the benefit of the shareholders.65 In their managerial roles,

52. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
53. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
54. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 104 (2011).
55. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 49, at 1046.
56. See FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 4–6.
57. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 49, at 1048.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1046–47, 1059 (“Because asset management necessarily involves risk and
uncertainty, the specific behavior of the fiduciary cannot be dictated in advance.”).
60. Id. at 1048.
61. See id. at 1047.
62. Id. at 1054; see also DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 9 (“The fiduciary principle is an
alternative to direct monitoring.”).
63. DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 8–9.
64. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 432 (1993); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308 (1976), available at http://business.illinois.edu/josephm/BA549_Fall%202012/
Session%205/5_Jensen_Meckling%20(1976).pdf (defining and discussing agency costs).
65. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 309; see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–31 (rev. ed. 1968)
(discussing the rise of the modern corporation and the separation of ownership and control).
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directors have fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.66
While the proscriptive rules of conduct under general fiduciary law are
fairly broad and undefined,67 Delaware has a sophisticated and developed
body of case law addressing corporate directors’ fiduciary duties.68 These
duties generally fall into two categories: the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty.69
a. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires directors to manage the business with the “care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances.”70 The Delaware Supreme Court has construed this to mean
directors must consider “all material information reasonably available to
them” before making a business decision.71 Under the business judgment
rule, courts presume that a director’s business judgment was made “on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”72 Thus, a director must commit
an act of gross negligence before he will have breached the duty of care.73
Corporations may adopt a charter amendment that exculpates directors
from monetary liability arising from a breach of the duty of care.74 While
this would remove the deterrent penalty of personal liability, adoption of a
charter amendment requires a shareholder vote—the managers cannot
unilaterally exculpate themselves without the owners’ informed consent.75
Such an amendment would still leave the shareholders with nonmonetary,
equitable remedies.76

66. 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 141.2.1 (5th ed. Supp. II 2011); see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991).
67. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 50, at 1045–46; see also EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 90–91.
68. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 66, § 141.2 (discussing directors’ fiduciary duties
under Delaware law).
69. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(noting that the duty to act in good faith is not separate from the two core duties of loyalty
and care).
70. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
71. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
72. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
73. See, e.g., id. at 881.
74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). The board is also statutorily
protected when relying on records and on opinions from specialists in the ordinary course of
business in order to discharge their duties. Id. § 141(e).
75. See id. § 242(b)(1).
76. See id. § 102(b)(7).
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b. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty is the duty of fidelity to the corporation and its
shareholders.77 This includes the duty to act in good faith.78 Though
generally shareholders owe no duties to each other, controlling shareholders
(ones that can control a necessary vote) are also subject to the duty of
loyalty.79 Under the duty of loyalty, directors and controlling shareholders
must avoid “any conflict between duty and self-interest.”80 Any selfdealing on the part of a director or a controlling shareholder will be subject
to careful scrutiny of intrinsic fairness.81 For example, in a merger, the
duty of loyalty requires the transaction to pass a two-prong entire fairness
test consisting of fair price and fair dealing.82 A conflicted transaction can
be ratified by a vote of disinterested directors or by a vote of the
shareholders.83 Liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty can never be
exculpated, even with shareholder consent.84
B. The History and Structure of LPs and LLCs
This section will review the genesis and characteristics of limited
partnerships and limited liability companies.
1. Limited Partnerships
In contrast to corporations, which originally had to be chartered by the
monarch in order to exist,85 partnerships originated as agreements among
In that respect, their origins resemble contracts.87
individuals.86
Partnerships are associations of two or more persons who are co-owners of
a business.88 There is an agency relationship between partners to act on

77. 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 66, § 141.2.1.2.
78. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(finding no independent fiduciary duty of good faith that is separate from care and loyalty).
79. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
80. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
81. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
82. Id. at 711.
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2005).
84. See id. § 102(b)(7)(i).
85. Corporations have their roots in medieval England, where the monarchy alone could
charter a corporation, allowing the organization to exist beyond the life of the parties to an
agreement. See 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 40 (London, J.
Butterworth 1793).
86. The partnership can be traced back to early English mercantile courts in the form of
the societas, an early form of business enterprise. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A.
SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1:2
(2012). Societas had similar characteristics to partnerships: the right to an accounting
between partners, the agency relationship between partners to act on behalf of the
partnership, and liability of each partner for the obligations of the partnership. See id.
87. See id.; EUGENE ALLEN GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS,
INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1 (1911).
88. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914) § 6(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001); see also
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 101(6), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001).
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behalf of the partnership, as each has the power to act on its behalf,89 and
all partners are liable for its obligations.90
The innovation of the limited partnership was to limit such liability to the
general partners.91 A limited partnership consists of an association of at
least one general partner and one limited partner.92 While the general
partner continues to be personally liable for the obligations of the
partnership,93 the limited partners are liable only to the extent of their
capital contributions.94 With this protection, they relinquish direct control
over the management of the partnership.95 Like the relationship between a
corporation’s board and its shareholders, the general partner manages the
business for the limited partners.96 Partnerships are also attractive business
forms because they have significant tax benefits compared to
corporations.97
2. Limited Liability Companies
The LLC is a relatively new option for business organization.98 A hybrid
form, it developed from a variety of sources, including limited partnerships,
business trusts, and statutory close corporations.99 The Delaware LLC Act
is modeled on the Delaware LP Act, and the two statutes contain
89. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 86, § 1:2.
90. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 306(a), 6 U.L.A. 117 (2001).
91. See DEMOTT, supra note 51, at 492; GILMORE, supra note 87, at 592–93. The
Uniform Limited Partnership Act was created in 1916. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916)
(superseded 1976), 6B U.L.A. 405 (2008). Delaware has now also authorized limited
liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs). See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-1001 (2005 & Supp. III 2012) (requirements for formation of LLP);
id. § 17-214 (limited partnerships as limited liability limited partnerships).
92. Id. § 17-101(9).
93. Id. § 17-403(b) (stating that general partners have the liabilities of partners under the
Delaware Uniform Partnership Act).
94. See id. § 17-303(a).
95. Id. (“A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless
. . . he or she participates in the control of the business.”). There are, however, several
exceptions enumerated in the statute. Id. § 17-303(b)(1)–(10) (listing activities that do not
constitute participating in control of the business within the meaning of section 17-303(a)).
96. See id. § 17-403(a) (stating that general partners have the rights and powers of
partners under the Delaware Uniform Partnership Act).
97. See ROBERT J. HAFT & PETER M. FASS, TAX-ADVANTAGED SECURITIES HANDBOOK
§ 2A.01 (1997) (pass through taxation). Partners can also benefit from partnership losses
because losses also pass through and therefore can be used as deductions for individual
partners. See I.R.C. § 469 (2006) (passive activity losses); see also infra note 102 and
accompanying text.
98. 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.06 (1992) (discussing the emergence and history of LLCs); see
also Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1459 (1998). The LLC was approved for partnership taxation by the I.R.S. in 1988. See
Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361; see also 1 CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 1.01[1] (2005). The Delaware
Limited Liability Company Act was passed in 1992. Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del.
Laws 1329 (1992) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109).
99. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 1.06; 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 98, ¶ 1.01[1].
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substantially identical wording.100 The primary characteristics of LLCs are
that they are taxed as partnerships, members and managers all enjoy limited
liability, and the relationship of the members, managers, and entity is
governed by the operating agreement.101
Limited liability companies thus combine corporate limited liability with
partnership tax advantages102 and governance flexibility.103 Unlike a
limited partnership, the LLC does not need to have any general partners,104
and it can have a centralized or decentralized management structure, with
members and managers maintaining limited liability whether or not they
participate in control of the business.105
3. Operating Agreements Are Contracts
The nature and structure of each individual LP and LLC, are largely
dependent on the operating agreement.106 Both statutes provide only the
contours of the entities, giving parties the “broadest possible discretion in
100. See Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Delaware Limited Liability Companies, in
2 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.3 (R. Franklin
Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., Supp. 2011).
101. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 1.02; Lubaroff & Altman, supra note
100, § 20.4.
102. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 2.02; Lubaroff & Altman, supra note
100, § 20.1. The development of business association forms has been largely driven by two
goals: minimizing taxes and limiting personal liability. See, e.g., Hamill, supra note 98, at
1463–64. Historically, the two options were corporations, which provided limited liability
but were taxed in their own right—known as double taxation—and limited partnerships with
the general partner as a corporation, which provided limited liability and single taxation,
since partnerships are not taxed in their own right. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The other possibilities for minimizing taxes are S Corporations and zeroing out a regular
C Corporation. 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 97, ¶ 1.01[2][b]–[c]. While
S corporations also offer flow-through taxation, the LLC is less restrictive. Id. ¶ 1.01[2][b];
see I.R.C. § 704(a)–(b) (2006). Even when successful, zeroing out does not provide any of
the other advantages of pass-through tax status. 1 BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 97,
¶ 1.01[2][c].
At first, the I.R.S. required that the LLC lack two corporate characteristics, and if it
did not, it would be taxed as a corporation. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98,
§ 16.12, at 39. This changed with the advent of “check-the-box” classification, and the IRS
began taxing LLCs as partnerships even if the entity otherwise resembled a corporation. Id.
§ 16.03. The federal tax regulations, known as the “check-the-box” rules, became effective
on January 1, 1997. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1996).
Note that publicly traded LLCs and LPs lose the partnership status for tax purposes
and are instead taxed as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006). The exception to this rule
occurs when at least 90 percent of the LLC or LP’s income is generated from passive asset
management activities, such as collecting interest, dividends, rent on real property, or
particular oil, gas, timber, and other natural resources activities. See id. § 7704(c)–(d).
103. LLCs are not constrained by corporate formalities or boards of directors required by
statute. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 98, § 2.02. LLCs also lack the financial
constraints that corporations have, which place limitations on the dividends corporations can
distribute. Id. § 1.03.
104. Id. § 1.04. (“Because the members of LLCs have limited liability . . . LLC statutes
usually protect creditors through rules regarding disclosure, distributions, and dissolution
that are not waivable in an agreement solely among the members.”).
105. Id. § 1.05.
106. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 & n.27 (Del. 1999).
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drafting their . . . agreements.”107 In addition, both the LP Act and the LLC
Act explicitly incorporate the principle of freedom of contract.108 The
statutes read, “It is the policy of [the LLC Act] to give the maximum effect
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited
liability company agreements.”109 This means that Delaware courts will
enforce the product of the parties’ negotiations,110 as long as the provision
does not conflict with statutory requirements.111 In other words, “[t]he
operative document is the limited partnership [or limited liability company]
agreement and the statute merely provides the ‘fall-back’ or default
provisions where the partnership [or limited liability company] agreement is
silent.”112
C. Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LPs and LLCs
The prior section detailed the history and structure of limited partnerships
and limited liability companies and discussed their similarities. This
section will examine the application of fiduciary duties in these entities.
1. The Default
In limited partnerships, the general partner owes fiduciary duties to the
limited partners.113 The Delaware Court of Chancery has also held that
when the general partner is a corporation, that corporation’s board of
directors owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners.114 Limited partners
generally do not owe fiduciary duties, but they assume fiduciary duties if
they take an active role in the management of the partnership.115
In limited liability companies, much the same rules apply.116 Each
member owes fiduciary duties to the LLC, its investors, and the manager,117
with one qualification—Delaware courts differentiate between passive

107. Id. at 291 n.27 (comparing limited liability companies to limited partnerships that
both have “maximum flexibility”).
108. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2005) (explicitly incorporating the
principle of freedom of contract for LLCs); id. § 17-1101(c) (same for LPs).
109. Id. § 18-1101(b); id. § 17-1101(c).
110. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 n.33 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008) (“Contractual language defines the scope, structure, and personality of limited
liability companies.”).
111. See Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 290 (“[An LLC] permits members to engage in private
ordering with substantial freedom of contract to govern their relationship, provided they do
not contravene any mandatory provisions of the Act.”).
112. Twin Bridges Ltd. P’ship v. Draper, No. Civ. A. 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at
*12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007).
113. See Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981).
114. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43 (Del. 1991).
115. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 662 (Del. Ch. 2012) (citing Cantor
Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No. 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at *22 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2000)).
116. Id.
117. VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31,
2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001).
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members and managing members,118 with only managers and managing
members owing fiduciary duties.119 In addition, Delaware courts have
found that “controlling members in a manager-managed LLC owe the
traditional fiduciary duties that directors and controlling members in a
corporation would.”120
2. Elimination Permitted
As discussed above, fiduciary duties in general partnerships, trusts, and
corporations are part of the structure of those entities and cannot be
waived.121 The same is not true of Delaware limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.122 At first, this flexibility was limited to
expansion or restriction of fiduciary duties.123 In Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
while parties to a limited partnership could expand or restrict fiduciary
duties, they could not fully eliminate them.124 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court reasoned that it could not override the doctrinal
importance of fiduciary duties in Delaware business law, and it emphasized
the “underlying general principle in [Delaware] jurisprudence that
scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected.”125
In 2004, the Delaware General Assembly amended the Delaware LP and
LLC Acts to explicitly permit parties to eliminate fiduciary duties.126 The
Delaware Limited Partnership Act now provides,
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties
(including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner
or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership
agreement . . . .127

118. Feeley, 62 A.3d at 662 (“Under the LLC Act, there are two basic types of members:
members who are also managers and exercise managerial functions in a member-managed
LLC, and members who are passive investors like limited partners.” (citations omitted)).
119. Id.
120. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *1, *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010).
121. See supra notes 48–50, 65–84 and accompanying text.
122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005) (permitting expansion, restriction, or
elimination of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (same in limited
liability companies); cf. supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text (discussing the
constraints of the corporate form).
123. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167
(Del. 2002).
124. See id. at 167. But see Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(stating that the Limited Partnership Act “apparently [allows] broad license to enhance,
reform, or even eliminate fiduciary duty protections”).
125. Gotham Partners, 817 A.2d at 167.
126. See 74 Del. Laws 612 (2004) (amending the LLC Act); id. at 589 (amending the LP
Act).
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (emphasis added).
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The relevant language of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act is
identical.128
Again recall that corporations can never eliminate fiduciary duties.129
Corporations can adopt charter amendments exculpating directors from
liability for breach, but only for breaching the duty of care130—never for
liability arising from breaching the duty of loyalty.131 Like corporations,
LPs and LLCs can exculpate their fiduciaries from all monetary liabilities
for breaches of all fiduciary duties,132 but unlike corporations, they can
completely remove fiduciary duties in the first place.133
Even total exculpation of fiduciaries’ liability may leave a remedy extant:
By limiting or eliminating the prospect of liability but leaving in place the
duty itself, [such] a provision . . . restricts the remedies that a party . . .
can seek. Monetary liability may be out, but injunctive relief, a decree of
specific performance, rescission, the imposition of a constructive trust,
and a myriad of other non-liability-based remedies remain in play.134

Elimination of all fiduciary duties, however, arguably leaves no remedy for
manager misconduct.135 The Delaware Supreme Court has upheld these
provisions even when the LLC was publicly traded.136
a. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The remaining statutory safeguard against manager misconduct,
assuming all fiduciary duties have been eliminated, is the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Both statutes state that “the partnership
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.”137 The implied covenant is a contractual principle that
inheres in every contract,138 and it likewise applies in LP and LLC

128. Id. § 18-1101(c) (“[D]uties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by
provisions in the limited liability company agreement . . . .”).
129. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (“[A] limited liability company agreement
may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith
violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); id. § 171101(f) (same for partners and partnership agreement).
133. See id. §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c).
134. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 664 (Del. Ch. 2012) (citing Arnold v. Soc’y
for Savs. Bancorp, Inc. 678 A.2d 533, 541–42 (Del. 1996) (interpreting the effect of a
similar exculpatory provision under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7))); Leslie v.
Telephonics Office Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 13045, 1993 WL 547188, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1993) (same); see also Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1011 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(considering a plaintiff’s complaint seeking to enjoin the proposed merger).
135. See Feeley, 62 A.3d at 664.
136. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008).
137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d). The relevant section of the LLC Act again
contains identical language. See id. § 18-1101(c).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
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agreements.139 It is a mechanism that courts use to protect an agreement
between parties, and it is only applied to matters not explicitly addressed in
the agreement.140
The implied covenant is not intended to do more than protect “the spirit
of what was actually bargained and negotiated for.”141 The implied
covenant is applied when one party has acted “arbitrarily or unreasonably,
thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain that the asserting party
reasonably expected.”142 The covenant does not impose separate duties,
and therefore, to successfully argue that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implies extracontractual responsibilities, the plaintiff must
identify specific contractual provisions on which his claim is based.143
3. What Remedy If Silence?
It has not been entirely clear whether fiduciary duties apply as a default
to LPs and LLCs in absence of language in the operating agreement that
states otherwise.144 The Chancery has repeatedly affirmed the existence of
default fiduciary duties,145 but the Delaware Supreme Court has not ruled
on the issue, and there were some indications that, if the court were to
address such an issue, it might not find default fiduciary duties to exist.146
A recent episode of the dialogue between the Supreme Court and the
Chancery on this subject occurred in Auriga Capital v. Gatz Properties.147
Though the Chancery has repeatedly held that default fiduciary duties
apply, Auriga Capital is notable because it is the first time the Chancery
discussed the topic in some depth.148 Its conclusion was a resounding
139. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c). For further discussion of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing’s scope in the alternative entity context, see
Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied
Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW.
1469 (2005).
140. Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC, 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citing Dave
Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch. 1992)).
141. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008) (footnotes omitted).
142. Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting
Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010)).
143. Id.
144. See H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013); see also Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga
Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012) (disagreeing with the lower court’s
interpretation of identical language).
145. See, e.g., Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-CS,
2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (holding the general partner liable for
breaching her fiduciary duties because no provision in the partnership agreement modified
traditional fiduciary duties); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (“[The] LLC agreement does not explicitly alter those default fiduciary
duties and . . . consequently, [the] managers and controlling members owe Plaintiff the
traditional duties of loyalty and care.”); see also Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649,
660 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting the “long line of Chancery precedents holding that default
fiduciary duties apply”).
146. See Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1206.
147. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 839.
148. Id. at 849–56.
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statement that, “where the core default fiduciary duties have not been
supplanted by contract, they exist.”149
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court, referring to the Chancery’s
position on default fiduciary duties, said such a discussion was “dictum
without any precedential value.”150 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
the Chancery’s holding but did so “exclusively on contractual grounds.”151
As in previous cases that were appealed on this issue,152 the Delaware
Supreme Court found that the circumstances in Auriga Capital did not
require directly addressing whether default fiduciary duties applied and,
therefore, did not require addressing whether default fiduciary duties
existed.153
A few weeks later, in Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, the Chancery reaffirmed
its prior rulings regarding the existence of default duties.154 In Feeley, the
existence of default fiduciary duties was directly presented to the court—
this ruling was not dictum.155 Given the insistence and length of the
Chancery’s discussion in Auriga Capital,156 the strength of the Supreme
Court’s disagreement on the appeal,157 and the contractual bent of Justice
Steele’s private writings on the topic,158 practitioners seem to have been

149. Id. at 852.
150. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1218.
151. Id. at 1214.
152. Of the dozen or so cases addressing breach of fiduciary duties in LPs and LLCs
since the amendment in 2004, few have been appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. See,
e.g., William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749 (Del. 2011); Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136
(Del. 2008).
153. See Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1206 (finding defendant breached contractually stipulated
duties); William Penn P’ship, 13 A.3d at 749 (finding parties agreed that traditional
fiduciary duty analysis applied); Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010) (finding
defendants had merely exercised a contractual right, which did not implicate any equitable
analysis); Wood, 953 A.2d at 136 (finding defendant’s conduct was exculpated by the
relevant agreement to the extent that it was not fraudulent or illegal).
154. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659 (Del. 2012); see also David
Marcus, Laster Has Strine’s Back, DEAL PIPELINE (Dec. 3, 2012, 4:19 PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/laster-has-strines-back.php (discussing Vice
Chancellor Laster’s opinion in Feeley and the dialogue between Chancellor Strine and
Justice Steele regarding default fiduciary duties). In Feeley, a managing member of a real
estate investment firm organized as a Delaware LLC was alleged to have acted grossly
negligently and to have taken business opportunities that belonged to the company. Feeley,
62 A.3d at 653–54. The Chancery found there to be no “contractual obligation in the
Operating Agreement that would require . . . exercis[ing] due care or abjur[ing] intentional
wrongdoing,” id. at 659, but the court still denied the motion to dismiss the breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Id. at 666.
155. See id. at 660. No appeal was filed.
156. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 849–56, 855
n.65 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
157. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
158. See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221
(2009) [hereinafter Steele, Freedom of Contract] (disputing the necessity of default fiduciary
duties for LPs and LLCs); Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1
(2007) (same).
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justified in being wary of relying on default fiduciary duties.159 This
discussion seems also to have motivated the General Assembly to amend
the relevant statute.160
a. Statutory Interpretation
The full provision permitting elimination of fiduciary duties reads:
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties
(including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner
or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership
agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.161

From one perspective, this provision establishes default fiduciary
duties.162 The statutes read that fiduciary duties can be “expanded or
restricted or eliminated.”163 Logically, these duties must exist as a default
in order for that language to make sense.164 The statutes also presuppose
the existence of default fiduciary duties in the language referring to duties
“at law or in equity.”165 This language incorporates the long history of
fiduciary duties existing at common law, particularly in the partnership
context.166 Moreover, both Acts specify that when in doubt, equity
governs.167 Because fiduciary duties are equitable doctrines, such a
provision would seem to lend force to a reading of the statutes that finds
that default fiduciary duties are statutorily imposed.168
From another perspective, the provision abrogates default fiduciary
duties.169 Both Acts include a codification of the principle of freedom of

159. See, e.g., Paul D. Ginsberg et al., Delaware Supreme Court Interprets Contractual
Fiduciary Duties of LLC Manager As Requiring Entire Fairness Review, PAUL WEISS
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/
publications/delaware-supreme-court-interprets-contractual-fiduciary-duties-of-llc-manageras-requiring-entire-fairness-review.aspx?id=11824 (“Following [Auriga II], the question of
whether the Act imposes fiduciary duties on parties to an LLC agreement by default remains
an open issue under Delaware law.”).
160. See infra Part I.C.3.b.
161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2005).
162. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 850 n.34 (Del.
Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c).
164. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 850 n.34.
165. Id.
166. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 2012) (discussing
fiduciary duty precedent in the LLC and LP context).
167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1105 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter . . .
the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.”); id. § 18-1104 (incorporating substantially the
same language).
168. See Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 849, 852 (“The statute incorporates equitable principles.”).
169. See Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1219 (Del.
2012); supra note 158.
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contract,170 and they further include a provision that “[t]he rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no
application to this chapter.”171 Taken together, these provisions could be
read as permitting the freedom of contract policy to override the common
law tradition of fiduciary duties.172 According to this reading of the
statutes, no duties exist unless written in by the parties.173
b. New Legislation
Perhaps in response to this confusion, the Delaware General Assembly
recently amended the LLC Act, explicitly establishing that fiduciary duties
govern where not otherwise addressed by the statute.174 The text of the
amendment reads, “In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of
law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary
duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”175 The General Assembly did
not amend the LP Act, which, as noted before, had previously contained
identical language on the applicability of fiduciary duties.176
The synopsis of the bill states that the amendment serves to confirm
circumstances in which fiduciary duties apply even when not explicitly
addressed in the operating agreement.177 One such circumstance, the
synopsis notes, is “a manager of a manager-managed limited liability
company[, who] would ordinarily have fiduciary duties even in the absence
of a provision in the limited liability company agreement establishing such
duties.”178 Assuming courts will take this statement into account when
interpreting the language of the amendment itself, this amendment still
leaves open whether default duties apply in member-managed LLCs and
LPs.179
4. Operating Agreements in Practice
This section explores courts’ treatment of fiduciary duties in LLC and LP
operating agreements.

170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(c), 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of this chapter to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”).
171. Id. §§ 17-1101(b), 18-1101(a).
172. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 227 (“[I]mplicit in the sections
above, the statutes do not provide any fiduciary duties, default or mandatory.”).
173. See id.
174. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013).
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (emphasis added).
176. See id. §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c).
177. H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013).
178. Id.
179. See id.
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a. Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual Modification
When fiduciary duties are operating, they can invalidate an explicit
contractual provision.180 In Paige Capital Management, LLC v. Lerner
Master Fund, LLC, the partnership agreement did not address fiduciary
duties,181 and therefore the court found the manager of the fund owed
default fiduciary duties to the fund and its investor.182 The plaintiff, the
fund’s only investor, sought to withdraw its capital under an early
termination option.183 The manager attempted to keep the capital in the
fund, pursuant to a provision limiting withdrawals of certain percentage
interests in the fund.184 While a strict literal reading of the provision
arguably permitted the hedge fund manager to keep the investor’s money in
the fund, the court found reliance on such a provision to be a breach of the
manager’s fiduciary duty to the investor.185
The court invalidated reliance on the provision,186 finding that “the
[general partner’s] reading of the Partnership Agreement was not that of a
good faith fiduciary grappling with the meaning of an ambiguous
partnership agreement, but of self-interested minds bent on protecting their
own financial interests.”187 The court also noted that it was not a credible
scenario that a first-time hedge fund manager would be able to negotiate a
clause that permitted her to hold the investor’s capital in order to maintain
her income if she could not raise other capital.188 The court found it
“reasonable to conclude that the [investor] would have walked away
immediately” had the manager insisted on such a clause.189

180. See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502 CS, 2011 WL
3505355, at *34 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011).
181. Id. at *31 (“[T]here is no provision of the Partnership Agreement that says that Paige
General Partner does not owe fiduciary duties to the Fund and its investors.”).
182. See id. (“As a matter of default law, Paige General Partner clearly owes fiduciary
duties to the limited partners in the Hedge Fund.”).
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *34.
186. Id. at *35.
187. Id. at *34; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(e) (2005).
188. Paige Capital, 2011 WL 3505355, at *34.
189. Id.
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b. No Fiduciary Duties, Only What Is in the Contract
If default fiduciary duties do not exist, or if they have been fully
eliminated by contract, the result is a contract that has almost no
extracontractual constraints on it.190 In Nemec v. Schrader, a claim was
brought under a Stock Plan,191 pursuant to which two former employees
had put rights to sell their shares back to the company within two years of
retirement.192 Under the contract, if they did not exercise those rights, the
company then could retire their stock.193 Neither former employee
exercised the right, and the company retired the stock.194 This happened
just months before a merger which would have made the stock much more
valuable to the employees.195
Did the company have a duty to tell the employees about the possibility
of a valuable upcoming merger before the expiration of the time period
when they could exercise their put rights?196 The plaintiffs thought so, but
a majority of the Delaware Supreme Court did not.197 The court reasoned
that there was no fiduciary duty claim because the claim arose “from a
dispute relating to the exercise of a contractual right—the Company’s right
to redeem the shares of retired non-working stockholders.”198 The court
refused to override the express provisions of the contract by invoking either
fiduciary duties or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.199
Justice Jacobs, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the idea that just
because defendants had bargained for the right to redeem the shares, every
possible exercise of that right was permitted.200 He reasoned, “The grant of
an unqualified contractual right is not, nor can it be, a green light that
authorizes the right holder to exercise its power in an arbitrary or
unreasonable way.”201
Not all courts seem to share the sentiment expressed by Justice Jacobs.202
In Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, the Court of Chancery
refused to impose a “reasonableness overlay” on the exercise of a
negotiated right.203 Two LLCs had gone into business together to develop
190. Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“When parties
exercise the authority provided by the LP Act to eliminate fiduciary duties, they take away
the most powerful of a court’s remedial and gap-filling powers.”).
191. Nemec v. Schrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1129 (Del. 2010).
192. Id. at 1123.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1124.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1126.
198. Id. at 1129.
199. Id. at 1126, 1129.
200. Id. at 1132 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (citing Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade, No. 2822-CC, 2008 WL 4182998, at *1
(Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2008)).
202. See, e.g., id. at 1126, 1129 (majority opinion); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No.
3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008).
203. Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708,
at *1 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010).
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land in Snowmass, Colorado.204 One LLC claimed the other had breached
its fiduciary duties to the joint business by refusing to consent to proposals
that the first thought would make the business successful but that the
second thought would require each to contribute too much capital.205 The
court found that both LLCs had “contractually bargained to remain free to
give or deny [their] consent.”206 Because the agreement was “plainly
written” and had “no lack of clarity,” the court refused to imply
conditions.207
Another case where the parties had explicitly eliminated all fiduciary
duties is Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal.208 In Fisk Ventures, the parties
formed a biomedical technology company as an LLC.209 They designed the
governance structure of the company to require a supermajority vote of the
board for all essential decisions.210 When the Class A members sued the
Class B members for refusing to agree to a proposed financing plan,
arguably causing the company to fail, the court found the Class B members’
refusal to cooperate to be a bargained-for right, not a breach of duty, and
dismissed the claim.211
The relevant contractual provision read, “No Member shall have any duty
to any Member of the Company except as expressly set forth herein or in
other written agreements.” The court considered this an explicit elimination
of fiduciary duties and found no contractual provision imposing any “code
of conduct”—no requirements about the exercise of their bargained-for
right. The implied covenant could not function to imply fiduciary duties
since they had been eliminated in negotiation.212
c. The “Conclusively Presumed” Cases
The extent to which judicial intervention can be contractually eliminated
is illustrated in a series of cases involving a conclusive presumption in a
contract.213 A combination of provisions in the operating agreements
addressing conflicts of interest and provisions for reliance on professional
opinions seemed to lead to the elimination of plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty and
implied covenant claims.214 These cases were brought by holders of

204. Id.
205. Id. at *3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *6.
208. Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1, *9 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008).
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id.; see also Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P., No. 3148 VCN, 2012 WL
1564805, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
212. Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11.
213. See, e.g., Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No. 5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d, 67 A.3d 369 (Del. 2013).
214. See, e.g., In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301-VCP, 2012
WL 1142351, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012); Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, No.
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publicly traded units of limited partnerships.215 The plaintiffs were
challenging merger transactions on the grounds of a duty of loyalty
violation.216
Each partnership agreement had a provision governing the resolution of
conflicts:
[W]henever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between any
Affiliate of the Company, on the one hand, and the Company or any
Group Member, on the other, any resolution or course of action by the
Board of Directors in respect of such conflict of interest shall be permitted
and deemed approved by all Members, and shall not constitute a breach
of this Agreement . . . or of any duty existing at law, in equity or
otherwise, including any fiduciary duty, if the resolution or course of
action in respect of such conflict of interest is (i) approved by Special
Approval, (ii) approved by the vote of holders of a majority of the
Outstanding Common Units (excluding Common Units held by interested
parties), (iii) on terms no less favorable to the Company than those being
generally available to or available from unrelated third parties or (iv) fair
and reasonable to the Company, taking into account the totality of the
relationships between the parties involved (including other transactions
that may be particularly favorable to the Company).217

Even if default duties existed, the effect of this provision was to preclude
any breach (contractual or otherwise) if any of these four tests were met.218
The primary element at issue in these provisions was the Special
Approval.219 The Chancery has held that merely obtaining Special
Approval does not necessarily result in a judgment for the defendants,220
insisting that this process remains governed by the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.221

5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012), aff’d in part, 67 A.3d 400 (Del.
2013).
215. See, e.g., In re Encore Energy Partners L.P. Unitholder Litig., No. 6347-VCP, 2012
WL 3792997, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012).
216. See id. at *3; In re K-Sea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *1; Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *2;
Brinckerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *4; Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1011
(Del. Ch. 2010); see also supra Part I.A.2.b (discussing the duty of loyalty).
217. In re Atlas Energy Res. LLC, No. 4589-VLN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 28, 2010) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). Substantially identical language
was at issue in In re Encore, 2012 WL 3792997, at *9, Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1020, In re KSea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *7, and Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *9. Brinckerhoff similarly
involved actions of a Special Committee. See Brinkerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9.
218. See Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *10 (citing Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1020).
219. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. A Special Committee is often used by
boards of directors as a method of maintaining independence in decisionmaking and thus
obtaining the protection of the business judgment rule. See generally 1 WELCH ET AL., supra
note 66, § 141.2.3.5 (discussing the use of committees in approving conflicted transactions).
The board delegates the decision to a committee comprised of disinterested directors who
then review the transaction and vote on it, binding the entire board to the result of that vote.
See id. In this way, the committee functions as a proxy for arm’s-length bargaining. See id.
220. Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1021.
221. Id. at 1021–22. The issue in this case may have been one of pleading. The court
notes, “The complaint cites conflicts faced by directors who did not serve on the Audit
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The Special Approval in these agreements was novel in that all contained
a provision providing,
[The general partner] may consult with legal counsel, accountants,
appraisers, management consultants, investment bankers and other
consultants and advisors selected by it, and any act taken or omitted to be
taken in reliance upon the opinion (including an Opinion of Counsel) of
such Persons as to matters that [the general partner] reasonably believes to
be within such Person’s professional or expert competence shall be
conclusively presumed to have been done or omitted in good faith and in
accordance with such opinion.222

This provision affords less protection than the relevant Delaware
corporations statute, pursuant to which the general partner is protected only
if he relies in good faith on an opinion.223 The partnership agreement
provided that such good faith is conclusively presumed.224
The Chancery indicated that the conclusive presumption did not
necessarily bar an implied covenant claim.225 In Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge
Energy Co., when a committee of disinterested directors approved a joint
venture, the court found that because the committee relied on an investment
banker’s opinion that had found the venture was representative of an arm’slength transaction, the general partner was entitled to a conclusive
presumption of good faith.226 Fiduciary duties had not been explicitly
contractually eliminated, but the agreement contained clauses exculpating
the general partner from monetary liability unless it acted in bad faith.227
The Chancery held that the claim was precluded based on the facts alleged,
not on the contractual provision itself.228

Committee . . . but does not raise any challenge to the disinterestedness or independence of
the members of the Audit Committee.” Id. at 1022.
222. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11 (emphasis added). This provision goes further than
the applicable statutes, which provide:
A general partner . . . shall be fully protected from liability to the limited
partnership, its partners or other persons party to or otherwise bound by the
partnership agreement in relying in good faith upon the records of the limited
partnership and upon information, opinions, reports or statements presented by
another general partner of the limited partnership, an officer or employee of the
limited partnership, a liquidating trustee, or committees of the limited partnership,
limited partners or partners, or by any other person as to matters the general
partner reasonably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert
competence . . . .
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-407(c) (2005) (emphasis added); see also id. § 18-406
(providing the same protection to members and managers of LLCs).
223. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-407(c).
224. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11; see also Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No.
5526-VCN, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), aff’d, 67 A.3d 369 (Del.
2013); Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1022.
225. See Lonergan, 5 A.3d at 1022 (“On the present allegations, the grant of Special
Approval must be conclusively presumed to have been . . . in good faith.” (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
226. Brinckerhoff, 2011 WL 4599654, at *9.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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While the Chancery found that there were situations in which the
contractual provision did bar an implied covenant claim, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed that holding. In Gerber v. Enterprise Products
Holdings, LLC and In re K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P. Unitholders
Litigation, the Chancery found that the plaintiffs had alleged bad faith,229
absent a conclusive presumption in the contracts at issue.230 Because of the
contractual provision, in both cases the defendants were entitled to the
conclusive presumption of good faith.231
In Gerber, the allegation was that the general partner had acted in bad
faith when choosing to use the Special Approval process, abusing its
discretion by taking advantage of the duty limitations in the operating
agreement.232 The court held that the plaintiff could not “plead that a
defendant breached the implied covenant when the defendant is
conclusively presumed by the terms of a contract to have acted in good
faith.”233
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.234 Relying on a distinction
between good faith as a fiduciary duty and good faith with regards to the
implied covenant,235 the court found that since the statute prohibited the

229. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11.
230. See id. at *12 (“Absent contractual modifications, Gerber could plead a breach of the
implied covenant.”).
231. See id.; see also In re K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P. Unitholders Litig., No. 6301VCP, 2012 WL 1142351, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2012). In In re K-Sea, the allegation was
that the general partner had incentivized the otherwise independent Conflicts Committee
members to approve the merger. In re K-Sea, 2012 WL 1142351, at *9.
The court held that once the committee relied on the expert opinion, it was entitled to
the contractually stipulated presumption of good faith and no breach of fiduciary duty or
implied covenant could be alleged. Id. at *9–10. The court found that approval by the
Special Approval process in the operating agreement was conclusive and had no requirement
that it be “fair and reasonable to the Partnership.” Id. at *8.
The court went on to say that such reliance would probably benefit unaffiliated
shareholders. Id. at *10 (“On its own, Section 14.2 endows [the general partner] with
unfettered discretion to consent to a merger and submit it for unitholder approval. [The
conclusive presumption,] however, incentivized [the general partner] to obtain a fairness
opinion and rely upon it in connection with its approval of the merger.”). Because the
unitholders had a right to veto the merger by vote, “to the extent that unitholders are
unhappy with the proposed terms of the merger . . . their remedy is the ballot box, not the
courthouse.” Id. at *8.
232. Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *11.
233. Id. at *12; see also In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., No. 6347VCP, 2012 WL 3792997, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (rejecting claims of bad faith based
on reliance on an expert opinion that contractually entitled the general partner to a
conclusive presumption of good faith, even though plaintiffs had alleged that the controlling
unitholder had intentionally driven down the company’s trading price before proposing the
merger).
234. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 421 (Del. 2013).
235. Id. at 418–19 (“Under a fiduciary duty or tort analysis, a court examines the parties
as situated at the time of the wrong. . . . An implied covenant claim, by contrast, looks to the
past.” (citing ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member,
LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440 (Del. Ch. 2012))).
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elimination of the implied covenant, the parties intended a conclusive
presumption of good faith in terms of fiduciary duty.236
d. Ambiguity
The Court of Chancery has stated that the operating agreement must state
explicitly that fiduciary duties have been waived in order for them not to
apply.237 When the agreement is ambiguous on the point, the Chancery
In Bay Center
applies traditional contract interpretation rules.238
Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, Emery Bay was an LLC
organized to pursue a joint venture to renovate certain apartment buildings,
with Bay Center and PKI as its only two members.239 PKI was designated
the managing member, and Alfred Nevis, in turn, was the sole owner and
manager of PKI.240 Nevis was alleged to have secretly caused Emery Bay’s
credit facility to be renegotiated several times to its detriment but to his
personal advantage.241 Bay Center asserted that such action was a breach
of Nevis’s fiduciary duties.242
The relevant operating agreement addressed fiduciary duties, but it was
not clear as to whether they applied.243 Section 6.1 of the agreement read,
“The Members shall have the same duties and obligations to each other that
members of a limited liability company formed under the Delaware Act
have to each other.”244 Potentially in contradiction to Section 6.1, Section
6.2 read, “Except for any duties imposed by this Agreement . . . each
Member shall owe no duty of any kind . . . .”245 As with any ambiguity in a
contract, the Chancery permitted the claim based on these sections to
survive a motion to dismiss.246

236. Id. at 419.
237. See, e.g., Gerber, 2012 WL 34442, at *3–4 (finding no explicit alteration of the
traditional duties of loyalty and care and that therefore the managers and controlling
members owe those duties); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC Unitholder Litig., No. 4589-VCN,
2010 WL 4273122, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding the same between a controlling
unitholder and minority unitholders of a publicly traded LLC).
238. See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *8.
245. Id. (alterations in original).
246. Id.
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e. Substitution or Partial Waiver
There have been few cases that involve restriction, expansion, or
substitution of fiduciary duties, as opposed to the elimination of them.247
Auriga Capital is one of them.248 Auriga Capital involved a dispute
between the controlling member-manager, William Gatz, and the minority
investors of a Delaware LLC, Peconic Bay.249 Peconic Bay owned a longterm lease of a golf course owned by Gatz’s family.250 In 2009, Gatz
arranged for Peconic Bay to be sold to him in what the courts later found to
be a sham auction,251 leaving the minority members with an aggregate of
$20,985, a fraction of the company’s true value.252 The minority members
then filed a claim of breach of fiduciary duties, attempting to hold Gatz
liable for his conduct.253
Peconic’s LLC agreement contained two provisions relevant to the
analysis of the minority members’ breach of fiduciary duty claim against
Gatz.254 The first, section 15, provided a standard for entering agreements
with affiliates255:
Neither the Manager nor any other Member shall be entitled to cause the
Company to enter . . . into any additional agreements with affiliates on
terms and conditions which are less favorable to the Company than the
terms and conditions of similar agreements which could be entered into
with arms-length third parties, without the consent of a majority of the
non-affiliated Members.256

Gatz was an affiliate and never obtained a majority of the minority vote
approving the transaction.257
The second, section 16, was a liability exculpation clause, reading:
No Covered Person [defined to include “the Members, Manager and the
officers, equity holders, partners and employees of each of the
foregoing”] shall be liable to the Company, [or] any other Covered
Person or any other person or entity who has an interest in the Company
for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission
performed or omitted by such Covered Person in good faith in connection
with the formation of the Company or on behalf of the Company and in a
manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of the authority

247. See, e.g., Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp. (Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1212
(Del. 2012).
248. See id.
249. Id., 59 A.3d at 1212.
250. Id. at 1208.
251. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 873 (Del. Ch.
2012) (“[T]he Auction process used by Gatz was a bad faith sham. The process used was so
far short of minimally responsible as to render Gatz’s continued defense of it frivolous and
burdensome.”), aff’d, 59 A.3d at 1206.
252. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1212.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 1212, 1216.
255. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 857.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 856–57.
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conferred on such Covered Person by this Agreement, except that a
Covered Person shall be liable for any such loss, damage or claim
incurred by reason of such Covered Person’s gross negligence, willful
misconduct or willful misrepresentation.258

Based on these provisions and Gatz’s egregious conduct, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery’s ruling that held Gatz liable.259
While the Chancery had done so on the basis that default fiduciary duties
applied, since the agreement had not eliminated them, the Delaware
Supreme Court found Gatz liable on what it said were purely contractual
grounds.260 The Chancery, employing an equitable interpretation, had
found the “arm’s length terms and conditions standard” to impose “the
equivalent of the substantive aspect of entire fairness review, commonly
referred to as the ‘fair price’ prong.”261 The Chancery essentially imposed
the fair dealing prong as well, noting that the process “bears importantly on
the price determination.”262 The court went on to analyze Gatz’s disloyal
conduct, focusing on the value of the company, and found that he had the
burden to prove fairness and did not do so.263 Because of its default
fiduciary duty interpretation, the Chancery Court applied the exculpation
provision, section 16, to the totality of Gatz’s conduct—not just the auction
or the question of fair price.264
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, also imposing the twoprong entire fairness standard, as articulated in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,265
on Gatz.266 The Supreme Court did not require a contractual statement
imposing a “fiduciary duty,” such as “entire fairness standard,” or
“duty.”267 The court stated that the inquiry was one of function, not of
form.268 The Delaware Supreme Court analyzed whether the exculpation
provision covered Gatz’s conduct in the auction.269 Like the Chancery, the

258. Id. at 858.
259. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1216.
260. Id. at 1213 (recognizing “the contracted-for entire fairness standard”).
261. Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 857 (citing Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners,
L.P., 795 A.2d 1, 27 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff’d, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002), and Flight Options
Int’l, Inc. v. Flight Options, LLC, No. Civ. A. 1459-N, 2005 WL 2335353, at *7–8 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 20, 2005)).
262. Id. (citing Flight Options, 2005 WL 2335353, at *7 n.32).
263. Id. at 860–73.
264. Id. at 873.
265. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
266. See Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 856; see also Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp.
(Auriga II), 59 A.3d 1206, 1213–1214, 1214 n.27 (Del. 2012).
267. Auriga II, 59 A.3d at 1213 (“To impose fiduciary standards of conduct as a
contractual matter, there is no requirement in Delaware that an LLC agreement use magic
words.”).
268. Id. (“Viewed functionally, the quoted language is the contractual equivalent of the
entire fairness equitable standard of conduct and judicial review.”).
269. Id. at 1216–18.
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Delaware Supreme Court found Gatz had acted in bad faith, and both courts
imposed liability.270
II. DEFAULT OR NOT? THE TRADITIONALISTS VERSUS THE
CONTRACTARIANS
Part I described the origins of fiduciary duties and their role in
corporations. It went on to give a brief history of the genesis and
characteristics of LPs and LLCs. Lastly, it examined courts’ approach to
fiduciary duties in these entities when analyzing parties’ operating
agreements. Part II examines the reasoning regarding default fiduciary
duties. It addresses the traditionalist arguments for default fiduciary duties
and then compares the opposing contractarian arguments.
A. There Should Be Default Fiduciary Duties: The Traditionalists
Traditionalists advocate default fiduciary duties, focusing on the
extracontractual nature of fiduciary duties, their grounding in equity, and
their foundational doctrinal existence in business law.271 Traditionalists
maintain that to completely eliminate fiduciary duties as the default
standard of review for general partners or managers runs sharply against
precedent,272 is founded on an idealistic view of the bargaining and
contract-formation process,273 and ignores the necessity for regulation of
manager conduct.274
Fiduciary duties are hundreds of years old and are foundational to
partnership law doctrine.275 Traditionalists argue that contractarians ignore
the rights and responsibilities that arise “when people join their property
270. See id. at 1216; Auriga I, 40 A.3d at 873 (“The Auction process was not a good faith
effort to generate bids at a good price for Peconic Bay. Rather, the sham Auction was the
culmination of Gatz’s bad faith efforts to squeeze out the Minority Members.”).
271. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 54, at 195–96 (discussing the main features of a
fiduciary relationship); Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into
Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451, 452 (2006); Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-waivable
Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 702 (2011).
272. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, “They’ve Created a Lamb with
Mandibles of Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms,
76 IND. L.J. 271, 282–91 (2001); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the Glue of
Capitalism: Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People’s
Money, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 767 (2012).
273. Callison & Vestal, supra note 272, at 295, 296 n.125; Johnson, supra note 271, at
709, 713.
274. Kleinberger, supra note 272, at 767; Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1611–12 (2004).
275. See supra Part I.B.; see also Johnson, supra note 271, at 709–13; Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through
Alphabet Soup to Contract As Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 460 (2008) (“It has
been hornbook law for centuries that a partnership inherently and inescapably involves
fiduciary duties among the partners.” (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP §§ 172, 174–81 (William S. Hein & Co. 1980) (1841), and NATHANIEL
LINDLEY, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING ITS APPLICATION TO JOINT-STOCK AND OTHER
COMPANIES 412 (15th ed. 1984))).
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and their efforts in a common business enterprise.”276 The “legal reality is
that the manager of an LLC or general partner in a partnership is in a
fiduciary relationship, as Delaware law conceives that relationship.”277
Traditionalists thus see this movement to contract law as a significant
departure from established doctrine278 and argue that precedent should not
be lightly rejected.279
Traditionalists contend that contractarians rely on a simplistic view of the
contract formation process,280 which does not incorporate transaction costs
and certain institutional realities.281 Moreover, traditionalists argue,
contractarians overestimate not only the prescience of those drafting
contracts,282 but also the extent to which precision is beneficial.283
Ambiguity in contracts is likely both necessary and inevitable.284 Fiduciary
law is left purposely indeterminate so as to confer the judicial flexibility
required to deal with a variety of situations that might not be encompassed
in a single rule.285
Traditionalists also urge the importance of constraining managerial abuse
of discretion.286 The argument is that abuse undermines both individual

276. Kleinberger, supra note 275, at 466.
277. Johnson, supra note 271, at 723–24; see J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal,
Contractarianism and Its Discontents:
Reflections on Unincorporated Business
Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 501 (2009) (“Historically, the status
of ‘partner’ has inherently involved fiduciary duties among the partners.”).
278. Callison & Vestal, supra note 277, at 499; Kleinberger, supra note 275, at 466–67.
279. See Johnson, supra note 271, at 713. Johnson sees the elimination of fiduciary
duties as stripping the Delaware Chancery Court of equity jurisdiction, something that was
granted to it in the Delaware constitution and thus cannot be abrogated absent constitutional
amendment. Id. The statute must thus be read as “not alter[ing] the traditional jurisdiction or
power of the Chancery Court to interject and apply fiduciary duties in noncorporate
businesses.” Id.
280. Dibadj, supra note 271, at 464–70; Sandra K. Miller, Legal Realism, the LLC, and a
Balanced Approach to the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 729, 732–40 (2010).
281. Dibadj, supra note 271, at 467–68.
282. Callison & Vestal, supra note 277, at 504 (“[C]ontractarianism incorrectly assumes
human prescience.”); Dibadj, supra note 271, at 466–67. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
556 (2003) (“Given the limits on cognitive competence, as implied by ‘bounded rationality,’
incomplete contracts are the inevitable result of the uncertainty and complexity inherent in
ongoing business relationships. In turn, incomplete contracts leave greater room for
opportunistic behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
283. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes: Likely Issues for LLCs, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1043, 1044–45 (1995) (“[T]he participants may be unable to identify all of the
contingencies that would enable opportunistic conduct or, having identified such
possibilities, may be reluctant to articulate them because they fear destroying the deal
underway.” (footnote omitted)).
284. See id.
285. See Johnson, supra note 271, at 722 (“The dilemma is the usual one in designing and
interpreting categorical legal rules.”).
286. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 277, at 504–05; Dibadj, supra note 271, at 472
(arguing that fiduciary duties are important because they “provide a legal incentive for the
parties to get along by forgoing opportunistic conduct” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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investor confidence and the strength of the general economy.287 The
market alone does not afford sufficient protection.288 A pure contractarian
approach would impose costs from mismanagement on third parties who
rely on or transact with alternative entities.289
B. There Should Not Be Default Fiduciary Duties: The Contractarians
Contractarians contend that limited partnership agreements and limited
liability company operating agreements should be treated as pure
contracts.290
They assert that this approach promotes economic
efficiency291 and that the sophisticated parties that use alternative entities
can protect themselves through negotiation.292
Contractarians argue that the benefits of fiduciary duties are outweighed
by the costs.293 These costs include enforcement,294 impediments to the
manager’s discretion,295 and litigation of fiduciary duties.296 A reduction in
agency costs is accomplished through particular governance devices in
alternative entities that differ from corporate governance: mandatory
distributions, limited lifetime ending in mandatory liquidation, and
managers as owners.297 These serve to align manager and investor
interests, thus providing the discipline and incentive necessary to minimize
agency costs.298 Customizablility of fiduciary duties fits with the flexibility
287. See Johnson, supra note 271, at 722; Kleinberger, supra note 272, at 737–38; Sandra
K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Minimizing
Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 134–37, 169–78 (2008).
288. Kleinberger, supra note 272, at 767 (“Once courts stop thinking about managers as
handling other people’s money, the way is open to abandon ‘the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive’ and decay into ‘the morals of the market place.’” (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
289. But see Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 548–50, 557–559 (1997) (disputing traditionalists’ arguments
about the costs of waiving fiduciary duties).
290. See Ribstein, supra note 289, at 541–50; Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note
158, at 242; see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:
A Response to the Anti-contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing for a
contractarian approach to corporations).
291. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 233; cf. Cooter & Freedman,
supra note 50, at 1067–68 (arguing that while a contract for the purchase of goods
“provide[s] perfect incentives, [and therefore] the fiduciary relationship is replaced by
market exchange,” otherwise, “profit sharing alone cannot overcome the deterrence
problem”).
292. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 237.
293. See Ribstein, supra note 289, at 546–58; see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note
50, at 1064 (“The legal burdens on fiduciaries increase the cost of their services.”).
294. Ribstein, supra note 289, at 546.
295. Id. at 549.
296. Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 239.
297. Ribstein, supra note 35, at 290–98; Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and
Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 136–43.
298. Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 239 (observing the “effect on the
purported fiduciary’s incentives and the reduction of trust or reciprocity from substituting
legal duties for extralegal constraints” (quoting Larry E. Ribstein, A New Age?: Are
Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 212–13) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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of the form that can be tailored to a wide variety of businesses that have
different structural requirements.299
Contractarians also worry that implementation of default fiduciary duties
would distort the parties’ bargain because courts might not do thorough
enough contract interpretation, and instead rely on fiduciary duties to cover
any conduct that does not immediately fall within the contract
provisions.300 Moreover, fiduciary duties are not clearly defined and thus
keeping some of them but eliminating others might not be fully effective.301
Contractarians suggest that fiduciary duties should instead be treated as a
contractual element.302
Contractarians note that the parties who make use of alternative entities
are generally sophisticated303 and are involved in the bargaining that results
in the operating agreement that defines the entity.304 Contractarians reason
that including or not including fiduciary duties in an operating agreement is
a “conscious choice,”305 and is not a “rational gap” that needs to be filled
by the judiciary.306
III. DEFAULT FIDUCIARY DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, AND WAIVER
Part II outlined the debate between traditionalists and contractarians
regarding the wisdom of requiring default fiduciary duties. Part III first
argues that precedent and risk are the same in member-managed and
manager-managed LLCs and LPs, and therefore default fiduciary duties
should apply to both. Part III then recommends a combination of disclosure
299. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 50, at 1062 (“[D]ifferent levels of risk are
appropriate in different fiduciary relationships. For example, a trustee often is required to be
prudent and conservative in managing an asset, whereas a director of a start-up company
may be encouraged to take risks.” (footnotes omitted)); Ribstein, supra note 35, at 299–305
(discussing three different types of firms that tend to use the partnership structure and the
different fiduciary duty structures they require).
300. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 235–36.
301. Id. at 240 (“The nebulous nature of default fiduciary duties makes it difficult for
parties to eliminate some, but not all, potential fiduciary duties.”).
302. See Ribstein, supra note 289; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at
1–39 (arguing that fiduciary duties are contractual in nature).
303. Compare how securities regulation law accounts for the sophistication of parties.
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.24[1] (6th ed. 2009)
(discussing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953) (“The focus of inquiry
should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration.”)); see also
SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that
sophistication is not a substitute for access to information).
304. Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 237 (“The choice of the LLC form
was an intentional form, chosen by sophisticated parties because that form provides the
contracting parties with the maximum ability to customize their relationship.”). Steele notes
that this is a key difference between the LLC form and the corporate form. Id.
305. Mohsen Manesh, What Is the Practical Importance of Default Rules Under
Delaware LLC and LP Law?, WIDENER L. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/
delcorp/mohsen-manesh-what-is-the-practical-importance-of-default-rules-under-delawarellc-and-lp-law/ (“Sophisticated parties can and will contract to avoid undesirable default
rules. And LLCs and LPs with passive (presumably unsophisticated) investors have
contractually created an almost de facto rule eliminating fiduciary duties.”).
306. Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 237.
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and signatures be required in order for members and limited partners to
waive fiduciary duties.
A. Statutes and Precedent
Taking into account both the history of the statutes (including the new
amendment to the LLC Act) and the history of fiduciary duties at common
law, default fiduciary duties apply to both LPs and LLCs.307 They apply
not only to managers and general partners, but also to managing members
and to controlling unitholders of either.308 While none of these specific
duties are mentioned in the statutes, the statutes incorporate the lengthy
legal precedent regarding fiduciary duties.309
The legislature specifically crafted the statute to permit elimination; it did
not eliminate fiduciary duties by statute and permit parties to contractually
provide for them.310 The language in the statute, “parties may expand,
restrict, or eliminate fiduciary duties,” explicitly contemplates the existence
of those duties at common law.311 It would be impossible to expand,
restrict, or eliminate duties that did not exist in the first place. The debate at
common law that the 2004 amendment resolved was whether fiduciary
duties could be eliminated from LPs and LLCs, not whether they existed at
all.312
The LP Act specifies that when in doubt, equity governs.313 Fiduciary
duties are equitable doctrines, and therefore the language indicates that the
legislature intended default fiduciary duties to be imposed.314 The
incorporation of fiduciary duties has now been made explicit in the LLC
Act.315 This statutory emphasis on equitable doctrines and fiduciary duties
echoes the approach courts have always taken with regard to fiduciary
Partnerships, business trusts,
duties in business associations.316
corporations, and LLCs all place fiduciary duties on the manager.317 The
imposition of these duties continues in current Delaware jurisprudence.318

307. See supra Part I.C.3.a.
308. See supra Part I.C.1.
309. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
310. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1011(c) (2005).
311. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
312. Compare Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160,
167 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating that the Limited Partnership Act does permit restriction or
expansion of fiduciary duties, but does not permit elimination), with Sonet v. Timber Co.,
722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating that the Limited Partnership Act “apparently
[allows] broad license to enhance, reform, or even eliminate fiduciary duty protections”).
313. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104.
314. See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC (Auriga I), 40 A.3d 839, 852 (Del.
Ch.) (“The statute incorporates equitable principles.”), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
315. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c), 18-1104; see also supra Part
I.C.3.b.
316. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); see also supra Part I.A.,
I.C.1.
317. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part I.C.
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The emphasis in the statutes on the principle of freedom of contract does
not address the existence of default fiduciary duties.319 Some have seen the
contractually leaning provisions as an indication that the freedom of
contract policy overrides the common law of fiduciary duties in these
entities.320 But the freedom of contract principle in this context refers to the
ability of the parties to tailor the business to their needs.321 It does not
eliminate core elements of business organizations. The LP and LLC
statutes operate by providing the default but permitting parties to deviate
from that default if they so agree.322 It is no different for fiduciary duties.
The statute reads only “[t]o the extent that, at law or in equity, a member
or manager . . . [has] fiduciary duties.”323 Fiduciary duties are notoriously
ambiguous and fluid, which likely accounts for the language in the statute
not specifically identifying the duties that apply, but instead just
incorporating common law.324 This is particularly important in business
organizations such as the LP and LLC, which are extremely customizable.
The fiduciary obligations that are appropriate vary depending on the
structure that is created by the parties. If the default duties are unspecified,
that permits the appropriate level of protection for each individual
organization, and it permits common law to evolve as the forms continue to
develop. It also means that the application of these duties might not always
be entirely predictable.
If parties want to limit these fiduciary duties, and in doing so limit the
risk of unpredictable interpretation by the courts, they can limit those duties
by contract in the operating agreement. If they want more protection, they
can also increase the duties, again by contract. But then, the protections
will be contractual terms, and therefore contractual protections. The point
of having particular conduct requirements specified contractually is that
parties can indicate what they want and limit any extraneous fiduciary
duties that might effectively amend the contract. By limiting fiduciary
duties by contract, parties obtain predictability through pure judicial
enforcement of the agreement.
B. Negotiation and Disclosure: Formal Waiver Required
This section argues that default fiduciary duties apply in membermanaged LLCs and LPs. It then goes on to recommend that a combination
of disclosure and signatures be required to waive fiduciary duties.

319. See supra notes 162–72 and accompanying text.
320. See Steele, Freedom of Contract, supra note 158, at 227 (“[I]mplicit in the sections
above, the statutes do not provide any fiduciary duties, default or mandatory.”).
321. See supra Part I.B.3.
322. See supra Part I.B.3.
323. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005); see also id. § 17-1101(d).
324. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
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1. Consequences of Waiver
The consequences of eliminating fiduciary duties are significant,325 and
these consequences are a risk assumed by those not managing.326 If the
parties in Bay Center had waived all fiduciary duties, they would have
assumed the risk that one of them would secretly renegotiate the LLC’s
loan to the LLC’s detriment but to that party’s gain.327 The injured party
would have had no legal recourse unless there was an explicit contractual
provision prohibiting such conduct.328 Similarly, if the parties in Auriga
Capital had waived all fiduciary duties, the minority members would have
had no grounds to hold Gatz liable for the sham auction.329
These risks apply equally in manager-managed entities and membermanaged entities. While partial ownership may serve to align manager
interest with the other members to an extent, it is not enough to make
fiduciary duties inapplicable. All the same problems of control on one side
and lack of information on the other still persist. Default fiduciary duties
should therefore exist even in member-managed LLCs and LPs.
2. The Importance of Disclosure and Sophistication
Waiver or limitation of fiduciary duties in LPs and LLCs should be
focused on disclosure. The agreement must disclose the level of risk posed
to members or partners if fiduciary duties are waived or limited, and the
person assessing the risk must have the capacity to do so.330
Elimination or limitation of fiduciary duties creates a serious increase in
risk for members or limited partners.331 Parties might wish to assume such
risk if they believe they will share in the upside. But such assumption must
be bargained for,332 and in order to bargain fairly, it is critical that the risk
be disclosed and that parties fully understand what rights they are
relinquishing.
3. More Clarity Required
At the moment, the language required to waive fiduciary protection is
relatively vague.333 The extent of the waiver can be determined by the
interaction between several different provisions in the agreement.334 This
problem can be mitigated through particular contractual requirements. The
clause waiving duties should be in all capital letters. It should be required
to be signed by all members or partners, and each time a member or limited
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra Part I.C.4.b–c.
See supra Part I.C.4.b–c.
See supra notes 237–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–46 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.4.e.
See supra note 303 (discussing sophistication in the securities regulation context).
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.4; supra notes 303–06 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.4.c–e.
See supra Part I.C.4.
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partner is added, that member or partner must also sign the clause. This
provides the court with objective evidence that the bargain was negotiated
and that parties understood what they were waiving. Moreover, it serves as
an additional alert to the parties that they are relinquishing judicial
protection.
Unitholders of publicly traded LPs and LLCs are a special situation in
that they cannot engage in direct bargaining. Under federal securities laws,
the fact that fiduciary duties have been fully waived is required to be
disclosed, but it is not clear that prospective purchasers of these units would
necessarily understand the significance of this waiver.
The disclosures therefore should also include specific risk factors
identifying the consequences of the waiver.335 This type of analysis is
important because the waiver is not always total: for example, most
investors would not understand the effect of entitling a manager to a
conclusive presumption of good faith for reliance on expert opinions.336
These additional disclosures would provide the court with evidence that the
bargain was negotiated, through the market, and that the parties understood
the consequences of waiver. While requiring individual signatures would
be impractical for a public offering, these investors can protect themselves
through diversification.
CONCLUSION
This Note explores recent decisions interpreting operating agreements on
the issue of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties in Delaware LLCs and LPs
can be eliminated in the operating agreements. There has been an ongoing
debate over whether, and to what extent, default fiduciary duties apply to
these entities if no contractual language specifically eliminates fiduciary
duties.
This Note argues that default fiduciary duties apply to LLCs and LPs,
including member-managed LLCs and LPs, and it advocates that a
combination of disclosure and signatures of the members or partners be
required in order to waive fiduciary duties in these entities. Such a
requirement would give courts clearer evidence of waiver, and it would
alert parties to the significance of such waiver.

335. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2013).
336. See supra Part I.C.4.c.

